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for any given budget outlay. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the largest land retirement program
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mechanism that maximizes total environmental benefits under a budget constraint. Since federal crop
insurance subsidies will not be incurred when a tract of land is retired from agricultural production, we
consider the impacts when avoided subsidies are accounted for in designing a land-retirement program. Based
on contract-level CRP offer data in 2003 and 2011 across the contiguous United States, we find that adopting
the cost-effective targeting enrollment mechanism can increase CRP acreage by up to 45% and total
environmental benefits by up to 21% while leaving government outlay unchanged. Incorporating crop
insurance subsidies into the land retirement design can increase avoided subsidies caused by CRP enrollment
and environmental benefits obtained from CRP. The government can enroll significant acres at zero real cost.
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Southeastern states but would decrease in the Midwest.
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Economics | Natural Resources
Management and Policy
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/561
 
 
Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve 
Program and its Interaction with Crop Insurance Subsidies 
 
Ruiqing Miaoa1, Hongli Fengb, David A. Hennessyb,c, and Xiaodong Dud 
 
 
Working Paper 14-WP 553 
November 2014 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This publication is available online on the CARD website: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to 
reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the author and the Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. 
 
aInstitute for Genomic Biology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801; 
bDepartment of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011; cCenter for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011; dDepartment of Agricultural & Applied Economics, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. 
 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, ethnicity, religion, national origin, 
pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. 
veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Interim Assistant Director of Equal Opportunity and Compliance, 3280 
Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612. 
  
Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program and its Interaction with 
Crop Insurance Subsidies 
 
Ruiqing Miao 
Hongli Feng 
 David A. Hennessy 
Xiaodong Du 
 
This draft: November 24, 2014 
 
Abstract: Strong demand for agricultural commodities, high crop prices and pressure to reduce 
government budget deficits heighten the need for land retirement programs to be designed to 
maximize environmental benefits for any given budget outlay. The Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) is the largest land retirement program while the federal crop insurance program 
(FCIP) is the largest federal program supporting U.S. agriculture. We examine the environmental 
and budgetary implications of alternative CRP enrollment mechanisms in the context of the 
program’s interactions with FCIP. We demonstrate that the current CRP enrollment mechanism 
is inconsistent with cost-effective targeting. We also identify a cost-effective targeting 
enrollment mechanism that maximizes total environmental benefits under a budget constraint. 
Since federal crop insurance subsidies will not be incurred when a tract of land is retired from 
agricultural production, we consider the impacts when avoided subsidies are accounted for in 
designing a land-retirement program. Based on contract-level CRP offer data in 2003 and 2011 
across the contiguous United States, we find that adopting the cost-effective targeting enrollment 
mechanism can increase CRP acreage by up to 45% and total environmental benefits by up to 
21% while leaving government outlay unchanged. Incorporating crop insurance subsidies into 
the land retirement design can increase avoided subsidies caused by CRP enrollment and 
environmental benefits obtained from CRP. The government can enroll significant acres at zero 
real cost. Under cost-effective targeting, CRP acreage and payments would increase in the Great 
Plains and the Southeastern states but would decrease in the Midwest.  
 
 
Significance: The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the largest land retirement program 
supported by the United States federal government, with 26 million acres enrolled as of May 
2014 and an annual program outlay of about $2 billion. We show that the program’s current land 
enrollment mechanism is not cost-effective. We identify an alternative enrollment mechanism 
that can increase CRP enrollment by up to 45% and environmental benefits by up to 21% for the 
same government outlay. We also show that a CRP land enrollment mechanism that accounts for 
interactions between the CRP and the federal crop insurance program, the largest program 
supporting U.S. agriculture, will reduce CRP outlays while improving environmental benefits. 
 
Keywords: Conservation Reserve Program, Cost-effectiveness, Crop Insurance, Environmental 
Benefit Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program and Its Interaction 
with Crop Insurance Subsidies 
Conservation effectiveness when facing resource constraints is a central theme in the 
ecological conservation literature. Cost-benefit analysis has been advocated as a basic tool to 
enhance conservation effectiveness (1–3). This paper focuses on the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), the largest land retirement program supported by the United States federal 
government, and shows that CRP’s effectiveness can be significantly enhanced by 
appropriate use of cost-benefit targeting and by accounting for interactions between CRP and 
federal crop insurance program (FCIP), the largest U.S. agricultural commodity subsidy 
program.  
CRP has about 26 million acres enrolled as of May 2014 at a program outlay of nearly $2 
billion annually. It is a voluntary program that pays farmers to retire environmentally 
sensitive land from active production and plant it with grasses or trees for a contract period of 
10–15 years (4, 5). Most CRP land is enrolled through a competitive bidding process during 
general signup periods—designated periods of a few weeks during which farmers are invited 
to submit applications to enroll their cropland. The program was first authorized in 1985 and 
by 1990 the enrollment reached 33.9 million acres, which accounted for about 8% of the 
country’s total cropland. Enrollment in CRP ranged from 30 to 37 million acres between 
1990 and 2011, but has declined to about 26 million acres in 2014. CRP is generally 
considered to be successful in providing multiple environmental benefits including soil, water, 
wildlife, and other natural resources (6-8). 
Currently the CRP is faced with serious challenges. With strong demand for agricultural 
commodities and high crop prices, as well as pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, the 
Agricultural Act of 2014 will gradually reduce the maximum amount of land that can be kept 
in CRP from the current 32 million acres to 24 million acres by 2018. High crop prices also 
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mean that farmers will require higher rental payments to enroll their land into CRP, which 
will result in higher program outlays and hence dull the program’s political appeal (9). These 
new challenges heighten the need for a CRP enrollment mechanism designed to achieve 
maximum environmental benefit for any given federal government budget outlay.  
In this paper, we examine the environmental and budgetary implications of CRP 
enrollment in the context of the program’s interactions with FCIP, as well as how these 
implications vary with different enrollment policy designs. FCIP insures more than 250 
million acres of land with an annual average liability worth about $117 billion in 2011–2013 
(10). It supports farmers mostly through premium subsidies, which have averaged about 60% 
of total premiums paid in recent years. FCIP is predicted to cost about $8.9 billion per year 
over 2013–2022, making it the most expensive agricultural commodity program (11). Large 
literatures have examined the efficiency of the CRP and FCIP separately. Specifically, 
efficiency studies on CRP have emphasized indirect effects while efficiency studies on FCIP 
have addressed participation and adverse selection issues (12–14). However, interactions 
between FCIP and CRP have received little attention. 
CRP and FCIP can interact. CRP is targeted at removing cropland from production if the 
land performs sufficiently well according to the program's Environmental Benefits Index 
(EBI). Factors entering the EBI include wildlife impacts, water quality, air quality, erosion 
propensity, and carbon sequestration potential. Enrollment cost factors are also included 
where, ceteris paribus, land that commands higher rental payment will perform worse on the 
index and so is less likely to be accepted for enrollment. Omitted from the index, however, is 
the crop insurance subsidy reduction that would occur were the land removed from 
production. To underscore the omission’s significance, in some regions average crop 
insurance premium subsidies are comparable to average CRP rents and cash rents. For North 
Dakota, Table 1 indicates that some land could be taken out of production at no budgetary 
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cost to the government. That is, when crop insurance subsidies on a land tract are as large as 
its CRP rent the saved crop insurance subsidies through enrolling the land into CRP can 
completely offset its CRP payment. Although program fund sources differ, federal taxes 
spent and saved have equal weight when calculating the budget deficit. Moreover, were 
avoided crop insurance costs included in the index, then incentives for optimal land allocation 
would be strengthened because the inclusion would mitigate potential dissonance across the 
suite of agro-environmental policies.  
In this study, we show first that the current EBI is not cost-effective and is a form of 
maximizing net benefit per acre targeting where benefits measured in index points are 
assumed to be commensurable with land rental rates. By contrast, a cost-effective enrollment 
criterion requires cost-benefit ratio targeting so that environmental benefit per dollar spent is 
maximized. Cost-benefit ratio targeting is widely used for analysis of programs and 
regulations (1, 3, 15). We identify a cost-effective EBI and examine how crop insurance 
savings can be included in the current EBI and also in this cost-effective EBI. We then 
compare empirically the environmental and budgetary consequences of four alternative EBI 
design scenarios by using contract-level CRP offer data for the contiguous United States 
obtained from the Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). These four scenarios are: (i) the Baseline scenario under which EBI is kept at the 
status quo; (ii) Scenario 1, under which EBI in the Baseline is modified to include crop 
insurance subsidies; (iii) Scenario 2, under which cost-effective EBI is employed without 
including crop insurance subsidies; and (iv) Scenario 3, under which cost-effective EBI is 
employed and crop insurance subsidies are included. To facilitate exposition, we specify four 
comparisons. Comparisons I through III compare Scenarios 1 through 3 with Baseline, 
respectively; Comparison IV compares Scenarios 2 and 3.  
Results 
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Our analysis is based on actual enrollment data from Signups 26 and 41, two general signups 
that were conducted in 2003 and 2011, respectively. We select these two signups because 
crop prices, and hence crop insurance subsidies, were much higher in 2011 than in 2003. The 
large differences between insurance subsidies in these two years provide an opportunity to 
see the impacts of incorporating crop insurance subsidies over a wide range of values. In 
Table 2, we present summary simulation results where Baseline and Scenario 1 are 
constrained by the actual enrollment acreage that occurred under the two signups (2 million 
acres for Signup 26 and 2.8 million acres for Signup 41), while Scenarios 2 and 3 are 
constrained by the actual level of CRP real payment (defined as CRP rental payment minus 
saved crop insurance subsidies by CRP enrollment) that occurred under the two signups (i.e., 
$95.6 million for Signup 26 and $50.2 million for Signup 41). When comparing the scenario 
outcomes we focus on the following: (a) CRP enrollment acreage, program payment, and 
avoided crop insurance subsidies; (b) environmental benefits from CRP that are measured by 
environmental components of EBI (i.e., physical environmental benefits, labeled as EEBI); 
and, (c) geographic patterns in CRP enrollment changes under different designs.  
CRP enrollment acreage, program payment, and avoided insurance subsidies. 
Comparison II shows that when switching to the cost-effective targeting EBI design, enrolled 
acreage will increase significantly (42.3% and 26.6% for Signups 26 and 41, respectively) 
while keeping CRP real payments equal to that under Baseline. This shows the efficiency loss 
from using the current EBI, which is consistent with maximizing environmental benefits per 
acre instead of maximizing environmental benefits per dollar spent. Notice that the 
percentage change in acreage enrollment under Signup 26 is larger than that under Signup 41 
(see Comparisons II and III in Table 2). An explanation is that the comparison outcomes 
depend on acceptance rate (i.e., acreage accepted over acreage offered) for CRP offers. Under 
the Baseline the acreage acceptance rates in Signups 26 and 41 are 48% and 75%, 
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respectively (Table S1 in Supporting Information (SI)). A smaller acceptance rate in Signup 
26 indicates a more competitive selection and so a larger space for acreage increase starting 
from the Baseline. As an extreme example, if all CRP offers are accepted under each of the 
four scenarios then scenario outcomes will not differ. Figure S1 in SI depicts the difference 
between the four scenarios when CRP real payment varies. Given the large magnitude of 
insurance subsidy in 2011 (see Table S1 in SI), it is not surprising that about 50% of the CRP 
acreage can be enrolled at zero real payment. 
For Signup 41, when crop insurance subsidies are included in the current EBI design (i.e., 
Scenario 1), the total annual CRP real payment is about 8.1% less than that under Baseline 
while leaving CRP enrolled acreage the same. For Signup 26, including crop insurance 
subsidies in the current EBI design can reduce CRP real payment by 1%. The reduction in 
real CRP payment is much larger under Signup 41 than that under Signup 26 because subsidy 
per acre in 2011 (year of Signup 41) was almost quadruple that in 2003 (year of Signup 26) 
(see Table S1in SI).  
Adopting cost-effective targeting EBI and incorporating insurance subsidies into EBI 
design have significant impacts on avoided subsidies. Under the Baseline for Signup 26, the 
total avoided crop insurance subsidies equaled about $16.9 million, which amounted to about 
15% of total nominal CRP payment (i.e., CRP rental rents) for enrolled acres. If cost-
effective targeting is applied then the avoided subsidies would increase by 41.1% when 
compared with Baseline (see Comparison II in Table 2). When insurance subsidies are 
incorporated into cost-effective targeting EBI design, then the avoided subsidies would 
increase by 47.3% for Signup 26 (see Comparison III in Table 3). Under the Baseline for 
Signup 41, the saved crop insurance subsidies are about 63% of nominal CRP payments 
whereas under Scenario 3 the percentage becomes 68%. The crop insurance savings are much 
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larger under Signup 41 than those under Signup 26 because, as mentioned above, subsidy per 
acre in 2011 was much larger. 
Environmental benefits from CRP. Larger environmental benefits from CRP, as 
measured by total EEBI, are achieved with cost-effective targeting EBI than the current EBI. 
For example, Comparison II shows that total EEBI of enrolled acres increases by 20.5% and 
15.3% in Signup 26 and Signup 41, respectively. The increased total EEBI is largely from the 
increased enrolled acres under Scenario 2. Since enrolled acres increase more under Signup 
26 than under Signup 41 (i.e., 42.3% versus 26.6%), the total EEBI increase under Signup 26 
is larger than that under Signup 41. For the same reason, the EEBI per enrolled acre decreases 
under Scenario 2 when compared with the Baseline scenario, and the decrease is larger under 
Signup 26 than under Signup 41 (-15.3% versus -9%).  
Table 2 also shows that incorporating crop insurance subsidies into the current EBI 
design will increase total EEBI of enrolled acres, average EEBI per enrolled acre, and 
average EEBI per dollar of CRP real payment (see Comparison I in Table 2). For Signup 26, 
the increases are small. For Signup 41, since an 8% decrease in CRP real payment occurs 
under Comparison I, we see a relative larger increase in EEBI per real payment dollar under 
Comparison I, namely 11.2%. The reason for the relatively small impacts when incorporating 
crop insurance subsidies into the current EBI is that the cost component has significantly 
fewer points available than the environmental component. For both Signups 26 and 41, 
maximum points available for the cost component are 150, whereas maximum points 
available for the environmental component are 395. Incorporating crop insurance subsidies 
by subtracting these subsidies from the rental rate only changes the cost component. When 
crop insurance subsidies are relatively low, as in 2003, they are a small fraction of the rental 
rate and so incorporating subsidies had little impacts.  
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Geographic patterns in CRP enrollment changes. When compared with Baseline 
scenario, Scenarios 1–3 result in noticeable geographical patterns for the changes in CRP 
enrollment (see Figures 1 and 2). The Great Plains and Southeastern United States would 
gain CRP acreage and payments while the Midwest will see reductions. Accordingly, the 
Midwest would gain more commodity revenues and crop insurance subsidies under Scenarios 
1–3 than under Baseline. These regional differences in CRP enrollment are important because 
of implications for welfare distribution and regional politics, and also because spatially 
distinct environmental and natural resources are concerned.  
Table 2 also presents the amount of acres that change status. That is, these acres either 
changed from being accepted to being rejected or vice versa. The largest differences are 
observed under Comparison III, under which a total of 46.8% and 24.5% of total offered 
acres would change enrollment status in Signups 26 and 41, respectively. Figures 1 and 2 
shows changes in CRP acres under Comparisons I, III, and IV for Signups 26 and 41, 
respectively. The patterns of CRP acreage changes are similar. CRP enrollment will increase 
in areas with high subsidy-rent ratios, such as the Great Plains and Southeastern States. These 
are in the main marginal cropland regions where CRP enrollment costs are low and 
environmental benefits may be high. What makes these locations marginal for cropping and 
environmentally sensitive often also makes them poor crop insurance prospects, which 
indicates high insurance premiums and subsidies. 
By contrast, under Scenarios 1–3, the Midwest would lose CRP acreage relative to the 
Baseline because cropland in this region requires higher CRP rental rates and receives lower 
crop insurance subsidies when compared with cropland elsewhere. For example, in Iowa the 
CRP rent and subsidies in 2011 are $128.1/acre and $32.4/acre, respectively, whereas in 
North Dakota these two numbers are $36.2/acre and $55.3/acre, respectively (Table 1). 
Notice that the CRP acreage change across regions is not significant in Comparison I because 
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the total enrolled CRP acreage in Scenario 1 and Baseline is the same. However, large 
differences exist between cost effective targeting EBI and current EBI as shown by 
Comparison III (Figures 1 and 2).  
Cost effective targeting would overwhelmingly favor low rent regions whether or not 
crop insurance subsidies are incorporated. Our analysis suggests that the central Corn Belt 
will have an even lower enrollment rate if cost effective targeting is used. Furthermore, the 
region along southern Iowa and northern Missouri will be less competitive compared to other 
regions based on EEBI points and rental cost information submitted in Signups 26 and 41.   
This may raise concerns that CRP enrollment under the cost-effective targeting criterion 
would de-emphasize productive regions with erodible land (e.g., southern Iowa and northern 
Missouri).  
Discussion 
Strong demand for food and biofuels in recent years has increased the pressure to draw more 
land into agricultural production. On the other hand, both CRP and crop insurance programs 
are receiving intensive scrutiny as legislators seek to tighten federal budget outlays. The 
intent of this article is to promote a better understanding of how EBI design affects the cost-
effectiveness of CRP and interactions between CRP and the federal crop insurance subsidy 
program with a focus on the budgetary and environmental impacts. Given that the 
Agricultural Act of 2014 will gradually reduce total acreage enrolled in the CRP, it is likely 
that competition to enroll in the program will strengthen so long as CRP rental payments are 
not too low compared to cash rental rates. The enrollment mechanism used will likely play a 
more important role in future signups in order to ensure program cost-effectiveness. We show 
that there is significant potential to improve upon the CRP’s enrollment mechanism and that 
large regional redistribution of enrolled CRP acres would result. We also illustrate how 
avoided crop insurance subsidy costs can be calculated for entry as a cost consideration in an 
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environmental benefit index. The potential benefits of doing so are two-fold: to assist in 
managing total program tax dollar cost and to better screen land into its most efficient use. 
Based on CRP enrollment data from Signups 26 and 41, as well as crop insurance subsidy 
data in corresponding years, we simulate the impacts of including avoided crop insurance 
subsidies into EBI calculations under different EBI designs.  
It is important to note that our results are based on the current environmental benefit 
scores for various factors. If the central Corn Belt provides benefits that are not captured in 
the current calculation, then integrating these benefits into EEBI would increase this region’s 
competitiveness in CRP enrollment. One caveat is that the government also subsidizes crop 
insurance by paying the administration and operating (A&O) costs, which amounted to $1.4 
billion in 2012, compared to $7.1 billion in premium subsidies (16). If enrolling land in CRP 
reduces some of these A&O costs, our results would underestimate the budgetary impacts of 
incorporating crop insurance subsidies into the CRP enrollment formula.  
Methods 
Conceptual Framework. In this section, we model CRP’s enrollment mechanism. Most 
CRP land is enrolled through a competitive bidding process during general signup periods. 
FSA assign an EBI to each offer based on the offer’s environmental benefits and rental 
payment requested by the landowner. Then all offers are ranked according to EBI and offers 
with EBI no less than the cut-off EBI will be enrolled into CRP. Let EEBI denote 
environmental benefits of an offer and kr  denote the rent per acre requested in an offer for 
land tract k. The formulation of EBI under the current CRP is as follows: 
 ( )  extrEBI  EEB a bonusI   points,kf r= + +                                [1] 
where ( )kf r  is a function of the requested rental rate; and the extra bonus points are a 
relatively small number reflecting whether the offer requests cost share or how much the 
requested rental rate is below the weighted average soil rental rate (WASRR) of the offered 
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land. Under current CRP administration, ( )kf r  is set to be 
 ( ) 1 kk
rf r a
b
 = × − 
 
,                                                          [2] 
where parameters a  and b  are program administrator determined. Table S2 in SI presents 
values of these two parameters, the maximum possible points for the cost components, EEBI, 
EBI, and the cut-off EBI points for acceptance in some signups over 1997–2011.  
A notable feature of the EBI in equations [1] and [2] is that it is a linear combination of 
costs and environmental benefits. We refer this form of benefit targeting as “pseudo cost-
effective targeting.” The term “pseudo” is used here to emphasize that benefits and costs are 
not necessarily measured in a common unit and the EBI is not necessarily a true measure of 
net benefits. Before demonstrating that “pseudo cost-effective targeting” is consistent with an 
optimization problem to be described below, we first introduce some notation. Define by 
{1,2, ... , }k K∈Ω ≡  the kth parcel of land. Let ka  denote the size of parcel k. The set of all 
subsets of Ω  is written as ( )ΩP . Environmental benefits arising from land retirement 
amount to ke  per acre for parcel k. Therefore, if set ( )⊆ Ωh P  is placed in CRP then net 
environmental benefits amount to kkk e a∈∑ h . Then the optimization problem that induces 
“pseudo cost-effective targeting” can be written as: 
Optimization Problem 1 (OP1, pseudo cost-effective targeting): maximize environmental 
benefits with a linear adjustment of costs, subject to an acreage constraint. That is, 
 
[ ]( )max ( ) ,
     s.t.       ,
k kk
kk
ka e f r
a A
⊆ Ω ∈
∈
× +
≤
∑
∑
hP
h
h
                                           [3] 
where A  denotes the cap for total acreage enrollment. Let 1λ  denote the Lagrange multiplier 
representing the shadow value of acreage. Then the enrollment criterion for the kth parcel is 
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enroll if  ( ) ;
do not enroll if  ( ) .
k
k
k
k
e f r
e f r
λ
λ
+
<
≥

+
                                              [4] 
Comparing [4] with [1] and [2], we find that ( )k ke f r+  is the same as the EBI (except for the 
minor extra bonus points) if we treat EEBI as ke .  
OP1 assumes that benefits ke  and the transformation of rental rate, ( )kf r , are measured 
on comparable units such that summing the two terms is a meaningful operation. However, in 
the case of the current CRP, ke  is represented by EEBI, an index based on points assigned to 
physical environmental benefits, and ( )kf r  is a linear transformation of rental rate. Thus, in 
general, ke  and ( )kf r  will not be measured in a common unit.  
In contrast with OP1, a standard optimization problem that is associated with maximizing 
environmental benefits for a given monetary budget can be formulated as follows: 
Optimization Problem 2 (OP2, cost effective targeting): maximize environmental benefits 
subject to a budget constraint: 
( )max ,
     s.t.       ,
k kk
k kk
M
a e
a r
⊆ ∈
∈
Ω
≤
∑
∑
h
h
h P
                                                    [5] 
where M  denotes the CRP budget constraint. With 2λ  denoting the Lagrange multiplier for 
the shadow value of budget, the enrollment criterion for the kth parcel is 
2
2
enroll if ;
do not enroll if   .
/
/
k k
k k
r
r
e
e
λ
λ
≥

<
                                                   [6] 
In [6] the criterion is the ratio of benefit over cost. For any given budget, enrollment 
based on [6] will maximize benefits achievable. Equivalently, for any given amount of 
benefits achieved, the required cost will be minimized. So we refer to selection based on this 
criterion as “cost effective targeting.” In contrast with the criterion in [4], that in [6] does not 
require ke  and kr  to be measured in a common unit, and should be a meaningful measure to 
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use when comparing the cost effectiveness of the parcels in providing environmental benefits. 
OP2 is also commonly used in economic analyses with direct policy implications (17, 18). To 
our knowledge, no study has considered the nature of pseudo cost-effective targeting 
embedded in the current CRP enrollment procedure.  
Now we study how saved crop insurance subsidy can be incorporated into the EBI. Let ks  
be the dollar amount of premium subsidies per acre for land parcel k. If we value a dollar that 
would have been paid in premium subsidies the same as a dollar spent on CRP rental 
payments, then we can subtract ks  from kr  when making enrollment decisions. Thus, if crop 
insurance subsidies are to be taken into account, then equations [3] and [4] of OP1 would be 
adjusted as follows. 
Optimization Problem 1ʹ (OP1ʹ, adjusted pseudo cost-effective targeting): maximize 
environmental benefits with a linear adjustment of costs and crop insurance subsidies, subject 
to an acreage constraint. That is, 
[ ]( )max ( ) ,
     s.t.       .
kk
k
kk
k
ka e f s
A
r
a
∈⊆ Ω
∈
+ −×
≤ ′
∑
∑
h
h
h P
                                             [7] 
Then the adjusted enrollment criterion is 
 
1enroll if ( ) ;
do not enroll if   ( ) ,
k kk
k k k
e f r s
e f r s
λ
λ
+ −

+ − <
′≥
′
                                        [8] 
where 1λ′  is the Lagrange multiplier representing acreage shadow value. Including ks  will not 
change the program’s acreage constraint (i.e., A A= ′  ), but will change the CRP enrollment 
criterion. What may also change is the budget required to pay for enrolled acres. Integrating 
crop insurance subsidies will also change equations [5] and [6] of OP2 as follows. 
Optimization Problem 2ʹ (OP2ʹ, adjusted cost effective targeting): maximize 
environmental benefits subject to a budget constraint, when rental cost is offset by crop 
insurance subsidies:  
12 
 
( )max ,
     s.t.       ( ) ,
k kk
kkk k
a e
a r Ms
⊆ Ω ∈
∈
′≤−
∑
∑
hh
h
P
                                               [9] 
where M ′  is the government’s real CRP payment. The adjusted enrollment criterion is 
2
2
enroll if      / ( ) ;
do not enroll if   / ( ) .
k k
k
k
kk
e r s
e r s
λ
λ
−

− <
′≥
′
                                           [10] 
where 2λ′  is the Lagrange multiplier for the shadow value of budget. All else equal, inclusion 
of ks  in OP1ʹ and OP2ʹ will render a parcel with larger insurance subsidy per acre more 
competitive for CRP acceptance because its “net cost” is smaller. However, how the 
inclusion of ks  will affect the order of CRP offers based on adjusted EBI depends on the 
function ( )·f  and the relationship among kr , ,ks  and ke . In an extreme case, if ( )k kf r s− −  
( )kf r  is a constant for all k , then inclusion of ks  in OP1ʹ has no effect on CRP enrollment. 
Similarly, if ks  is a constant proportion of kr  for all k , then each parcel’s relative 
competitiveness based on [10] will be the same as that based on [6].  
Data and Simulation Approach. We obtained information on each CRP offer for Signups 
26 and 41 from FSA for the contiguous United States. The signup data include variables such 
as EBI for each land tract offered to CRP, rental rate offered by land owners, and whether an 
offer was accepted. Since the CRP offer dataset does not include crop insurance information, 
a matching mechanism is developed to map insurance subsidies to each CRP offer. County-
level insurance subsidies for the contiguous United States in 2003 and 2011 were obtained 
from the USDA’s Risk Management Agency (http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html). This 
dataset includes information on each insured crop such as insurance type, coverage level, 
insured acres, total premiums, and total subsidies. We first remove crops that are ineligible 
for CRP enrollment and then take the weighted average (using net insured acres as weights) 
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of total subsidies to obtain each county’s average subsidy per acre. Table S1 in SI presents 
summary statistics for the CRP and crop insurance data. 
We employ a simple polynomial curve fitting to map the county-level insurance subsidies 
to each CRP offer. To capture heterogeneous relationships between CRP rent and crop 
insurance subsidy across states, we fit a polynomial curve state by state. For each state in the 
dataset, we first regress county-level crop insurance subsidy on county-level WASRR using 
data available in a specific state. New Mexico data are pooled with Texas data while 
Wyoming data are pooled with Nebraska data because New Mexico and Wyoming have few 
counties enrolled in CRP. Here we use WASRR instead of CRP rental payment because 
WASRR is a better measure of land productivity and hence a better measure of the land’s 
insurance prospects. Suppose we estimate  
0
ln( ) [ln( )] ,ˆij j ijN nn
nS Rβ
=
=∑                                                         [11] 
where ijS  and ijR  are county-level insurance subsidy and county-level WASRR in county i 
of state j, respectively; and ˆ jnβ , {0,..., },n N∈  is the estimated coefficients for state j. In this 
study we set N = 4. Setting N = 3 or N = 5 only yields a negligible difference in terms of 
predicted insurance subsidies. Upon obtaining [11] for each CRP offer we then insert its 
WASRR into equation [11] and estimate the offer’s projected insurance subsidy. In order to 
avoid negative insurance subsidy predictions for a CRP offer, we utilize the natural logarithm 
transformation of the dependent variables and independent variables in equation [11]. This 
matching approach is similar to that used in (19) to obtain daily weather data from monthly 
weather information. To test for matching approach robustness, we also performed an 
alternative matching approach in which unit-level, instead of county-level, insurance subsidy 
information obtained from RMA are used. We show in SI that insurance subsidy predictions 
and simulation results from these two different approaches are close.  
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In line with the four optimization problems discussed in the conceptual framework 
section, we differentiate four scenarios in the simulation. We calculate the EBI under each 
scenario based on each problem’s enrollment criteria, that is,  
1
2
3
0Baseline ( EBI = EEBI + 
Scenario 1 ( EBI = EEBI + 
EEBI +Scenario 2 ( EBI =
EEBI +Scenar
OP1) :            1  + ,
( )OP1) :        1 ,
 OP2) :         ,
 OP2 ) :   io 3 ( EBI =      
k
k k
k
k
r c
b
r s c
b
c
s
r
c
r
a
a
 × − 
 
− ′ × − +  
−
′ ,
k
                       [12] 
where a and b are cost parameters as in equation [2]; and c represents extra bonus points.  
Once we have calculated EBI points for each scenario, the offered CRP parcels can be 
enrolled into CRP in descending order by each parcel’s EBI until the acreage or budget 
constraint is reached. For Baseline and Scenario 1, the acreage constraint for Signup 26 
(respectively, 41) is the actual acreage enrolled under Signup 26 (respectively, 41). For 
Scenarios 2 and 3, the budget constraint for a signup is the actual payment that occurred 
under the signup. In the simulation, we do not constrain CRP enrollment in a county to be no 
more than 25% of cropland, a constraint that is imposed by FSA. This constraint is omitted 
from our simulation because we only focus on two signups and CRP offers in these two 
signups are only a small fraction of CRP acreage stock. We are interested in the 
environmental benefits, acreage, payments, and saved crop insurance subsidies obtained from 
CRP under each scenario. Specifically, when * ( )⊆ Ωh P  is the selected set of parcels under a 
scenario then total environmental benefits are * k kk a e∈∑ h , total acres enrolled are * ,kk a∈∑ h  
total savings of insurance subsidies are * k kk a s∈∑ h , total CRP nominal payment is 
* ,k kk a r∈∑ h  and total CRP real payment is * ( )k kk ka r s∈ −∑ h . That is, we refer to real payment 
15 
 
as the different between total CRP nominal payments and total avoided crop insurance 
subsidies. 
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Table 1.  Average Crop Insurance Premium for Corn, Premium Subsidy for Corn, CRP 
Rental  Rate, and  Cropland Cash Rental Rate in North Dakota and Iowa (unit: $/acre) 
 North Dakota  Iowa 
Year Premium 
Premium 
Subsidy 
CRP 
Rent 
Cash 
Rent 
 
Premium 
Premium 
Subsidy 
CRP 
Rent 
Cash 
Rent 
2002 18.7 11.0 33.1 36.5 14.9 8.0 100.8 120 
2003 22.8 13.3 33.1 36.5  16.2 8.7 101.9 122 
2004 28.7 16.7 33.0 37.5  20.8 11.3 103.4 126 
2005 30.8 17.9 33.1 39.0  17.2 9.4 104.3 131 
2006 55.6 32.3 33.1 39.0  20.8 11.2 105.3 133 
2007 55.6 32.3 33.2 41.0  36.7 19.7 106.2 150 
2008 78.5 45.9 33.7 42.5  49.0 26.4 110.9 170 
2009 66.6 43.6 34.0 45.5  42.3 24.3 115.8 175 
2010 56.4 37.5 34.9 46.5  33.4 19.5 120.1 176 
2011 82.6 55.3 36.2 51.5  56.6 32.4 128.1 196 
2012 76.5 52.8 37.6 58.0  48.7 28.2 131.6 235 
Data source: All data are obtained from public datasets of USDA agencies. Premium and 
subsidy data are from RMA, CRP rent from FSA, and cash rent from NASS. 
19 
 
  
Table 2. Pairwise Comparisons Between the Scenarios Regarding Budgetary and Environmental Outcomes of CRP 
 Comp. I  Comp. II           Comp. III  Comp. IV 
 
Baseline 
Absolute 
values 
Percentage change from Baseline (%)  
Scenario 2  
Absolute 
values 
Scenario 3: 
percentage 
change from 
Scenario 2 (%) 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 Signup 26        
Total acres enrolled (million acres) 2.0 -  42.3 45.4  2.8 2.2 
Total annual CRP real payment (million $)* 95.6 -1.0  - -  95.6 0 
        Total annual CRP nominal payment (million $) 112.5 -0.5  6.2 7.1  119.5 0.9 
        Crop insurance subsidy saved per year (million $) 16.9 1.8  41.1 47.3  23.9 4.5 
Total EEBI of enrolled acres (million) 417.0 0.5  20.5 20.9  502.5 0.4 
Average EEBI per enrolled acre 210.1 0.5  -15.3 -16.8  177.9 -1.8 
Average EEBI  per dollar of CRP real payment 4.4 1.4  20.5 21.0  5.3 0.4 
Acres that change status (million acres)†  -  4.7  43.0 46.8  1.8 8.7 
Signup 41         
Total acres enrolled (million acres) 2.78 -  26.6 28.6  3.52 1.5 
Total annual CRP real payment (million $)* 50.2 -8.1  - -  50.2 0 
        Total annual CRP nominal payment (million $) 134.3 -0.9  16.3 17.5  156.1 1.1 
        Crop insurance subsidy saved per year (million $) 84.1 3.4  26.0 28.0  105.9 1.6 
Total EEBI of enrolled acres (million) 498.0 2.2  15.3 15.5  574.0 0.2 
Average EEBI per enrolled acre 179.1 2.2  -9.0 -10.2  163.0 -1.3 
Average EEBI  per dollar of CRP real payment 9.9 11.2  15.3 15.5  11.4 0.2 
Acres that change status (million acres)†  -  10.4  22.5 24.5  0.8 9.0 
Note: * Calculated by using total annual CRP nominal payment minus crop insurance subsidy saved per year. † Under Comparisons I to III, the percentage 
change from Baseline is calculated by using acres that changes status when compared with Baseline divided by total acres offered in a signup. Under 
Comparison IV, percentage change from Scenario 2 is calculated by i) obtaining the difference between “acres that change status when compared with 
Baseline” under Scenarios 3 and 2; and ii) divide the difference by “acres that change status when compared with Baseline” under Scenario 2. 
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Figure 1. Acres 
enrolled into CRP in 
Baseline and CRP 
acreage changes 
under Comparisons 
I, III, and IV 
(Singup 26). Note: in 
the map of Baseline, 
counties with gray 
border but without 
color are counties that 
have CRP offers but 
none of these offers 
are accepted. Counties 
with neither border 
nor color are counties 
that have no CRP 
offers. In the three 
maps of comparisons, 
counties with gray 
border but without 
color are counties that 
have no enrollment 
changes.  
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 Figure 2. Acres 
enrolled into CRP in 
Baseline and CRP 
acreage changes 
under Comparisons 
I, III, and IV 
(Singup 41). Note: in 
the map of Baseline, 
counties with gray 
border but without 
color are counties that 
have CRP offers but 
none of these offers 
are accepted. Counties 
with neither border 
nor color are counties 
that have no CRP 
offers. In the three 
maps of comparisons, 
counties with gray 
border but without 
color are counties that 
have no enrollment 
changes.  
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Supporting Information for “Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve 
Program and Its Interaction with Crop Insurance Subsidies” 
 
In what follows we show that the two matching approaches described in the “Data and 
Simulation Approach” section yield very similar crop insurance subsidy and final simulation 
result predictions. We first describe the data for insurance subsidy at insured-unit level and 
then the alternate matching approach, named quantile matching, which utilizes these data. An 
insured unit can be a single field or several fields on a farm. At the end we compare the 
results from quantile matching and those from the matching approach utilized in the main text, 
which is labeled as regression matching hereafter. 
The two matching approaches utilize the same CRP data. The difference in data between 
the two approaches lies in data for crop insurance subsidies. Unit-level crop insurance 
subsidy data for corn, soybean, and wheat in 2003 and 2011 and in 12 Midwestern states are 
obtained from Risk Management Agency (RMA) at USDA. These states are: Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin. This dataset includes rate yield (yield expected for a crop unit), insurance 
type, coverage level, premium, and premium subsidy of each insured unit. Table S3 in this 
Supporting Information (SI) shows corn, soybean, and wheat insurance data summary 
statistics for each of the 12 states. In 2011, in total 2.4 million insured units covered 186 
million acres of corn, soybean, and wheat within the 12 states. Crop insurance premiums and 
subsidies more than tripled between 2003 and 2011, largely due to increases in crop prices 
over that period. Moreover, like CRP rental rates, premiums and premium subsidies varied 
significantly across states. On average, premium subsidies accounted for about 50–65% of 
premiums across the states for the two years.  
1 
 
Even though both CRP offer data and the RMA datasets for corn, soybean, and wheat 
were contract unit-level data, the location of each contract unit within a county is not released 
for either type of dataset. Thus, we cannot directly link these datasets by land parcels and 
have to seek an alternative approach. The rate yield variable in the RMA data indicates an 
insured unit’s yield potential. Similarly, the weighted average soil rental rate (WASRR) in 
the CRP data represents the parcel’s productivity potential. To identify crop insurance 
subsidy for each parcel offered to CRP, we also develop a quantile-matching approach to 
establish a link between land parcels in CRP and RMA datasets using rate yield and WASRR 
as linkage variables. More specifically, for each county we estimate cumulative distribution 
functions (CDF) for corn rate yield, soybean rate yield, wheat rate yield, and WASRR, 
respectively. To match a CRP parcel with units in RMA corn, soybean, and wheat datasets, 
we first identify the CDF value of this parcel’s WASRR, and then the matched RMA units 
will be the corn, soybean, and wheat units that have the same CDF values based on the 
estimated rate yield distributions. Since we expect that land offered to CRP is usually less 
fertile, in the matching we only consider RMA units that have rate yield less than a certain 
percentile (the 30th percentile in this study) within a county. Below is the specific matching 
procedure. 
Step 1. For each crop (corn, soybean, and wheat) in each county, we identify RMA units 
that have rate yield less than the 30th percentile. Note that in this step we view all the rate 
yield observations for one crop within one county as the population.  
Step 2. Based on the RMA units obtained from Step 1, for each crop in each county, we 
estimate an empirical yield distribution. The empirical distributions are estimated using 
kernel density estimation which is implemented by MATLAB function “ksdensity.” Let 
(·),ckG  (·),
s
kG  and (·)
w
kG  denote, respectively, estimated CDFs for corn, soybean, and wheat 
in county k. 
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Step 3. Based on CRP offer data, for each county, we estimate an empirical distribution 
of WASRR. Let (·)kR  denote the estimated CDF of WASRR in county k. 
Step 4. Suppose the parcel j WASRR in county k is jkx . Based on the estimation result in 
Step 3 we can obtain ( )k jkR x . Then an RMA corn unit that matches with this parcel j will be 
the RMA corn unit that minimizes | ( ) ( ) |k ck k jkG y R x− , where cky  is the rate yield of a corn 
unit in county k. Following the same method we can match parcel j with a soybean unit and a 
wheat unit.    
Step 5. Based on matching results in Step 4, parcel j’s estimated crop insurance subsidy 
will be the weighted average subsidy of the matched corn, soybean, and wheat units. The 
weights are reported acres for the matched units. This completes our description of the 
quantile matching procedure. 
Table S4 summarizes the mean and standard deviation of the matched insurance subsidies 
for each state based upon the two matching approaches. We can see that on average the two 
matching approaches yield very close mean values of insurance subsidies. For Signup 26 the 
mean of predicted insurance subsidies from the two approaches are almost the same (differ 
only after the hundredths decimal place). For Signup 41, the subsidy means from the 
regression matching and quantile matching approaches are $30.81/acre and $30.52/acre, 
respectively. Since aggregate insurance subsidy data (i.e., county-level average) are used in 
regression matching, it is not surprising that the standard deviation of insurance subsidies 
obtained from the regression-matching approach is smaller than that from the quantile-
matching approach.  
Table S5 presents simulation results such as total CRP acres enrolled, total annual CRP 
real payment, etc., within the 12 Midwestern States under the four scenarios based on data 
obtained from the two matching approaches. Results show that these two matching 
approaches yield negligible differences. For example, the total acres enrolled under Scenarios 
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2 and 3 simulated by using the data from regression matching are almost the same as those 
simulated by using the data from quantile matching (may differ after the hundredths decimal 
place). The payments (including real, nominal, and saved insurance subsidy payments) differ 
slightly between the simulation results based on the alternative matching approaches. The 
difference is because the predicted insurance subsidies from the two approaches are slightly 
different. 
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Table S1. Summary Statistics for CRP Offer Data of Signups 26 and 41 as well as Crop 
Insurance Data in 2003 and 2011  
 Signup 26 
(Year 2003) 
Signup 41 
(Year 2011) 
 
Offered Accepted Offered Accepted 
Total number of offers 71,073 38,619 38,677 29,861 
Total acres (million acres) 4.15 2.00 3.75 2.82 
Average rent ($/acre) 48 52 47 48 
Average WASRR ($/acre)* 50 54 50 51 
Average EBI 271 302 270 286 
Average EEBI 177 210 161 179 
Average crop insurance premium ($/acre)† 14.7 50.1 
Average crop insurance subsidy ($/acre)† 8.6 31.2 
Note: * WASRR stands for weighted average soil rental rate. † Crop Insurance premium and 
subsidy for insured acres growing crops that are not eligible for CRP enrollment are excluded 
from calculation.  
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Table S2. CRP Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)--Points for Components 
sign-up number 15 16 18 20 26 29 33 39 41 
(sign-up year) (1997) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2003) (2004) (2006) (2010) (2011) 
Cost component parameter: a 190  125  125  125  125  125  125  125   125  
Cost component parameter: b 165 165 165 165 185 185 204 220 220 
Maximum of cost components 200 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Maximum of EEBI 400 410 410 410 395 395 395 395 395 
Maximum of EBI 600 560 560 560 545 545 545 545 545 
Cut-off EBI for acceptance 259 247 245 246 269 248 242 200 221 
Note: Cost component = a×(1-(rental rate/b)) + extra bonus points. Specifically, these extra bonus points are “N6b” and “N6c” in 
CRP signups. In Signup 26, N6b equaled 0 if a CRP offer required cost share and equaled 10 if not. N6c was the lower of 15 and 
the difference between rental rate and maximum payment rate. In Signup 41, N6c was eliminated while N6b measures how 
much the offered CRP rent was lower than the maximum payment rate. See links 
www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/crpebi03.pdf and www.fsa.usda.gov /Internet/FSA_File/crp_41_ebi.pdf for details. EEBI 
is the sum of the scores for environmental factors, and EBI = EEBI + cost components. 
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Table S3. Summary Statistics for RMA Insurance Data of the 12 Midwestern States in 2003 and 2011 
  
Corn  Soybean  Wheat 
 
States 
Number 
of Units 
Reported 
Acres 
Premium 
($/acre) 
Subsidy 
($/acre) 
Number 
of Units 
Reported 
Acres 
Premium 
($/acre) 
Subsidy 
($/acre) 
Number 
of Units 
Reported 
Acres 
Premium 
($/acre) 
Subsidy 
($/acre) 
20
03
 
Illinois 148,562 10,833,809 12 6 141,909 9,210,779 6 3 11,275 472,270 8 5 
Indiana 62,740 4,088,162 15 8 60,025 3,677,722 9 5 4,066 170,899 7 4 
Iowa 167,339 13,526,638 12 7 154,663 11,989,988 7 4 131 8,814 12 7 
Kansas 45,458 3,761,712 12 6 54,671 3,089,506 8 5 176,867 15,234,345 7 4 
Michigan 19,316 1,266,461 14 8 17,726 1,086,768 10 6 7,178 338,192 9 5 
Minnesota 85,188 7,443,395 15 9 91,101 8,215,170 9 5 18,121 2,045,047 12 7 
Missouri 42,348 3,305,906 13 8 65,532 5,448,817 8 5 10,467 626,953 6 4 
Nebraska 132,763 10,214,861 14 7 93,401 5,845,373 9 5 34,643 2,507,902 8 5 
North Dakota 18,584 1,678,414 18 11 35,358 3,934,778 10 5 108,686 11,475,508 9 5 
Ohio 42,692 2,470,580 15 8 48,006 2,971,164 10 5 10,771 422,095 6 4 
South Dakota 63,143 5,395,230 15 9 60,952 5,457,440 10 5 33,595 3,865,914 10 6 
Wisconsin 36,780 2,049,808 19 11 21,064 1,092,798 10 6 2,045 71,018 12 7 
12 States 864,913 66,034,975 14 7 844,408 62,020,302 8 4 417,845 37,238,957 8 5 
20
11
 
Illinois 165,720 13,437,896 38 22 151,798 9,753,491 23 13 14,341 633,482 31 20 
Indiana 70,306 4,936,483 48 28 70,276 4,358,936 33 19 6,081 281,279 32 19 
Iowa 176,911 15,875,033 43 25 140,707 11,085,629 26 15 244 8,705 40 24 
Kansas 74,988 6,578,764 40 25 71,810 4,650,846 30 19 144,258 12,870,889 21 13 
Michigan 30,019 1,787,419 51 35 25,250 1,380,584 39 25 9,692 479,259 31 20 
Minnesota 107,444 8,927,060 49 31 95,452 7,922,207 33 20 17,209 1,746,336 44 30 
Missouri 52,575 4,063,231 49 32 77,997 6,059,521 28 18 10,806 680,467 23 15 
Nebraska 146,215 12,052,479 42 25 92,018 6,194,190 30 18 25,911 2,049,950 21 12 
North Dakota 39,143 3,276,239 69 46 56,882 5,265,896 38 24 117,137 11,553,909 35 23 
Ohio 52,388 3,045,180 52 32 64,379 3,867,055 39 23 14,790 566,906 27 16 
South Dakota 86,722 6,851,722 55 37 78,141 5,497,352 32 21 34,034 3,586,358 35 23 
Wisconsin 54,207 2,806,803 67 44 27,950 1,225,292 44 28 6,037 213,181 37 24 
12 States 1,056,638 83,638,309 46 28 952,660 67,260,999 30 19 400,540 34,670,720 29 18 
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Table S4. Mean and Standard Deviation of Matched Insurance Subsidies per Acre from Regression Matching 
and Quantile Matching 
 
Signup 26 Signup 41 
 
mean ($/acre) standard deviation mean ($/acre) standard deviation 
State regression quantile regression quantile regression quantile regression quantile 
Illinois 8.00 8.08 1.09 3.20 32.13 31.41 4.30 14.57 
Indiana 9.32 7.92 2.04 2.87 34.44 30.58 4.19 12.07 
Iowa 7.43 7.19 1.44 2.74 29.07 29.05 2.52 9.87 
Kansas 7.15 8.50 0.76 2.72 27.90 26.50 2.46 8.90 
Michigan 8.54 7.93 0.55 3.54 30.11 27.89 1.79 9.83 
Minnesota 8.96 8.58 0.86 3.40 33.14 35.94 3.12 13.37 
Missouri 8.24 8.82 1.33 3.11 35.06 35.05 7.62 12.14 
Nebraska 9.26 9.76 1.03 2.88 27.15 26.28 4.59 7.35 
North Dakota 7.73 7.43 1.96 2.91 29.53 29.49 5.71 11.11 
Ohio 8.04 7.40 0.72 2.59 34.08 28.54 2.19 8.02 
South Dakota 8.30 8.23 1.15 2.53 30.51 32.06 6.08 10.24 
Wisconsin 9.56 9.33 0.95 3.99 36.73 37.54 2.62 15.59 
average 8.21 8.21 1.42 3.15 30.81 30.52 5.46 11.85 
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 Table S5. Comparing Simulation Results based on Regression Matching and Quantile Matching 
 
Regression matching 
 
Quantile matching 
 
Baseline Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3  Baseline Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 
Signup 26 
         Total acres enrolled (million acres) 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.6 
 
1.1 1.1 1.5 1.6 
Total annual CRP real payment (million $) 62.5 62.3 62.5 62.5 
 
62.2 61.6 62.2 62.2 
        Total annual CRP nominal payment (million $) 71.5 71.3 75.0 75.2 
 
71.5 71.1 75.2 75.7 
        Crop insurance subsidy saved per year (million $) 9.0 9.0 12.4 12.7 
 
9.3 9.5 13.0 13.4 
Total EEBI of enrolled acres (million) 237 237 278 278 
 
237 237 279 279 
Average EEBI per enrolled acre 213 213 181 179 
 
213 213 181 179 
Average EEBI per CRP real payment dollar 3.8 3.8 4.4 4.5 
 
3.8 3.8 4.5 4.5 
Acres that change status when compared with Baseline 
(million acres) - 0.04 0.85 0.92 
 
- 0.05 0.85 0.92 
Signup 41 
         Total acres enrolled (million acres) 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 
 
0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Total annual CRP real payment (million $) 31.9 32.1 31.9 31.9 
 
31.9 31.4 31.9 31.9 
        Total annual CRP nominal payment (million $) 57.0 57.3 63.5 64.4 
 
57.0 57.1 63.6 64.7 
        Crop insurance subsidy saved per year (million $) 25.1 25.2 31.6 32.5 
 
25.1 25.7 31.8 32.8 
Total EEBI of enrolled acres (million) 156 156 173 174 
 
156 156 173 174 
Average EEBI per enrolled acre 181 181 160 157 
 
181 181 160 157 
Average EEBI per CRP real payment dollar 4.9 4.9 5.4 5.4 
 
4.9 5.0 5.4 5.5 
Acres that change status when compared with Baseline 
(million acres) - 0.02 0.27 0.32 
 
- 0.04 0.27 0.31 
Note:  Baseline scenario and Scenario 1 are under acreage constraints, which are 1,111,714 acres and 860,445 acres, respectively, for Signups 
26 and 41. Scenarios 2 and 3 are under real-payment constraints. Regarding data from regression matching, the real payment constraints are 
$62,517,849 and $31,865,548, respectively, for Signups 26 and 41. Regarding data from quantile matching, the real payment constraints are 
$62,218,752 and $31,870,389, respectively, for Signups 26 and 41. The real payment constraints from the two matching approaches differ 
slightly because the predicted crop insurance subsidies under these two approaches differ slightly. 
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Figure S1. Proportion 
of Acreage, Subsidy 
Saved, and EEBI 
when CRP Real 
Payment Varies 
Note: Recall that CRP 
real payment is defined 
as CRP nominal 
payment minus saved 
crop insurance 
subsidies. The large 
magnitude of insurance 
subsidy in 2011 made it 
possible that about half 
of the CRP acreage can 
be enrolled at zero real 
payment. Since 
Baseline and Scenario 1 
are constrained by 
acreage cap and for 
some regions insurance 
subsidies are larger than 
CRP rent, the real 
payment can be 
negative when acreage 
caps are small.   
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